Transsexualism,' sometimes called eonism, is a little understood term. Medical comment is sparse, and there is little more than an inconclusive smattering of legal comment on transsexualism.
What does this infrequently heard term mean? Transsexualism has been called a "split between the psychological and the morphological sex ...", "a female personality in a male body.?" The individual concerned, in most cases a male; has an intense, usually obsessive desire for a complete sexual transformation: physically, mentally, legally and socially." Contrary to the transvestite, who merely desires, and is gratified by, "enacting" the woman's role by dressing himself in women's clothes, the transsexual wants to "be" .. woman, to "function" like a woman, and to be "accepted" as one; dressing as one is only one means to this end." Some authorities feel, however, that the urge of the transsexual male to be "all woman" is normally, in fact, the result of a rather shallow and distorted view of what a woman is really like socially, sexually, anatomically and emotionally."
The male transsexual has the feeling of "being in reality a woman"," whom nature by some cruel mistake has burdened and embarrassed with male genitalia. As a result, his visible sex organs are objects of disgust and deformity. Consequently, he "only lives for the day when his hated sex organs can be removed.i" So long as they live with these male organs, transsexuals are miserable, morbidly longing for the "conversion" surgery they think will make them look as they really should. If such conversion surgery is not readily available, which is normally the case due to the many legal dangers attendant to the operationfsj.t" the transsexual may well attempt self-castration, other mutilations and even suicide, or fall into a reactive psychosis.P Such self abuse is apparently not at all rare.P The so-called "conversion" surgery sought so obsessively by true transsexuals consists of several operative procedures. Normally, they are advised only after psychiatric and hormonal treatment of the patient has failed.P While the problem is not physiological, but psychological-psychosexual, there appear to be no satisfactory curative methods currently at the disposal of psychiatryr'" it is felt that the transsexual's "mind cannot be adjusted to accept the body.'?"
If psychiatric and hormonal treatment is ruled out as ineffectual, or prescribed along with surgery, the operation may-barring legal complications-be carried out. It involves castration, amputation of the penis, perhaps formation of the scrotum into female, labia-like folds by plastic surgery, and everi'" formation of an artificial vagina by inlay grafting.
Once the surgery has been performed it is far from a foregone conclusion that the patient's problems and anxieties will be solved. That "conversion surgery" will bring relief to the patient is true, that it will bring lasting relief is quite another matter. The subject's feminization cravings may continue and meet tragic frustration in the realization that he or "she" cannot acquire childbearing ability, but has accomplished only a change in the secondary sex characteristics.F Some patients demand the implantation of ovaries or uteri, thinking they can thus become capable of pregnancy.
"There seems to be an endless pursuit of a goal which is clearly impossible. "18 Even informed enthusiasts of "conversion" surgery concede such a realization on the patient's part as the possible "tragedy and the pitfall" of such a gamble.l" Transsexualism is to be distinguished from another, more mild sexual deviation with which it is sometimes confused: transvestism. The two are not synonymous. Whereas all transsexuals are transvestites, few of the latter are the former. The more mildly disturbed transvestite has no desire for conversion surgery. For him, his sexual organs are a source of satisfaction, not disgust and hatred. He is normally heterosexual," more often than not engages in relatively normal marital sex and seeks his deviational outlet merely by dressing in women's under and/or over garments. His problem is largely one of social and legal understanding, as will be mentioned, not of obsessional urge for full acceptance as a woman. He, in contrast with the transsexual, recognizes himself as a man, or woman, whichever is consistent with his sex organs and secondary sex characteristics.
The transsexual will have homosexual inclinations, but not consider them as such because he feels himself to be "in reality a woman" and consequently such desires, if in fact they exist, will be interpreted as quite natural and consistent with his true sexuality.
The incidence of transsexualism, while difficult to estimate, is clearly very low. Hamburger, et al., have reported knowledge of five cases in all of Denmark." five such cases and their treatment are reported from Sweden;" at least several have been reported in Britain in the past decade or two,23 and Dr. Benjamin, reporting on forty-four cases of "conversion" surgery, estimates there are no more than several hundred transsexuals in the United States.P'
The most publicised transsexual case was probably that of Christine Jorgensen, a young man who went to Denmark shortly after 1950 and eventually succeeded in undergoing "conversion" surgery or "change-of-sex." A thorough report of his case has been published by his attending physician.t" who operated only after insuring freedom from legal liability. The transsexual may, and in most instances will, differ from the hermaphrodite or intersexual, who is possessed of bisexual organ characteristics. Normally, the transsexual will be of a unitary sexual phenotype and karyotype: few if any male transsexuals have been been found to possess a female chromosomal constitution.t" The hermaphrodite, on the other hand, will always have a contradictory sexual constitution.
Klebs first classified hermaphroditism in 1876 into three basic categories: (1) "True hermaphroditism," where there are both testicular and ovarian elements in the gonads (one gonad may be a testis, the other an ovary); (2) male pseudohermaphroditism, where there are testes, but an otherwise more or less feminized status; and (3) female pseudohermaphroditism, where there are ovaries, but an otherwise virilized status." Whereas the transsexual may be considered as raising the problem of bringing the individual's mind into harmony with his body, the intersexual or hermaphrodite raises the problem of bringing the individual's bodyby surgical alteration-into harmony with his "rightful" sex.
Nonetheless, the evidence for biological (intersexualism) or psychological (transsexualism) bisexuality confirms the existence within the two sexes of many degrees of maleness and femaleness and of masculinity and feminity.:" Sexual determination is complicated by the existence of no less than eight recognized criteria of sex: chromosomal sex, gonadal sex, sex hormone pattern, internal sex organs, genital sex, habitus, assigned sex and sex role.t" The first two of these criteria are normally thought to be crucial in determining ultimate gender identity.t" (B) LEGAL ASPECTS
BRITAIN
In Britain today-both in Scotland and England-one can find case and comment alike dealing with transsexualism in some of its various ramifications. There is, however, no legislative or judicial authority respecting the legality of the operative procedures involved themselves, nor of the legal liability to which a physician performing such operations might expose himself.
(a) England
In England, "conversion" surgery is reported to have been performed on one Robert/Roberta Cowell in 1953 without legal incident.f' The reporter concluded that the procedure would be considered legitimate there "in some exceptional casee,"?" This guarded conclusion may be true, but still there is no dispositive authority. Dr. G. Williams states simply, "Even the so-called change-of-sex operation has not been thought of as raising legal problems, although it involves surgical interference with the genital organs."ss It would seem that one need only look at the general characterization of surgical operations by the Common Law as prima facie criminal assaults, normally "justified" only by consent or necessity, to doubt Dr. Williams's rather bold statement. The law on voluntary sterilization is far from clear in Britain, so one hesitates to accept his conclusion as to the much more drastic demembration involved in the change-of-sex operation.
Two reported English cases deal with problems closely allied to transsexualism, but neither appears directly in point. In B v. B,S4 the husband for a number of years was granted annulment from his wife, with whom he was unable to accomplish consummation by normal penetration. His wife, apparently an hermaphrodite, had undergone surgery for creation of an artificial vagina to facilitate consummation, but it still proved impossible. The legality of the surgery was not discussed.
In a more recent case, T v. T, the husband was granted a divorce in an undefended action. 3~He alleged his wife refused normal sexual relations and dressed and acted as a man, all to the known detriment of her husband's health and the viability of the marriage. The husband was granted a divorce on grounds of cruelty, it appearing the wife was a transvestite (not a more severe, usually male, transsexual). The settlement of the legality of the "conversion" operation in England must wait for the appropriate test case. It it unlikely that a problem of such infrequent incidence and dealing with sexual matters, which legislatures are notorious for circumventing rather than meeting head on, will be clarified or solved by statute. It is at least arguable that if the patient truly consents to the surgery and it is considered sound, professional, therapeutic treatment by practising physicians in the community, that the prima facie assault characterization of the operation(s) will be overcome by consent and good motive, necessity or some other legal defence acceptable to the court. The concurrence of medical opinion on this matter may attribute a greater faith among practising physicians and surgeons towards psychiatric opinion than in fact exists. But without it, the "therapeutic" justification for such a controversial, distasteful to many, operation would undoubtedly fail and criminal (and perhaps civil) liability would follow as the performing surgeon's fate.
Finally, it is well to remember that, barring the showing of a recognized therapeutic indication for the "conversion" surgery, the consent of the patient would almost surely be held invalid, the operation being a severe and "unlawful" physical invasion and deemed harmful to the ill-fated transsexual. 36
(b) Scotland
In Scotland, as in England, there is little relevant material. Stair'" mentions hermaphroditism only incidentally while discussing the validity of marriage, characterizing it as a condition, "where the one sex doth not eminently predominate." The only early commentator on Scots Law who mentions the problem of sex classification is Forbes, who in his "little known and not very authoritative's" text states, "The Sex is Male, or Female, or an Hermaphrodite, i.e., both Male and Female, which is esteemed to be of that Sex, which is most Prevailing in the Person."39
As mentioned earlier, the hermaphrodite is often not a transsexual. Forbes apparently relied on Justinian's Digest for his statement of Scots Law, which ascribed the more beneficial sex of male to those of doubtful sexual identity at birth,"? The issue of "true hermaphroditism" has been considered in modern times in Scotland. This issue arose in an unreported case decided by a single judge which involved an individual originally (at birth) registered as a female, but whose sexual identity had been subsequently changed to male in "The Register of Corrected Entries." Later it became necessary because of third party interests to seek judicial determination of this individual's sex. The judge was referred to a number of old authorities, none of which were in point on the question of how to determine sex. Sanchez." had suggested that in cases of "true hermaphroditism," where male and female characteristics were equally existent in the person, "he" should be able to make a final and irrevocable choice as to preferred sexual status. Rejecting such a suggestion and following civilian thought in this area, the judge concluded that persons born are either male or female, but added, "This is not self evident, since ... it might plausibly be argued that a true hermaphrodite was actually of both sexes and therefore legally of neither. Alternatively, the law might theoretically recognize a third category of hermaphrodites-neither male nor female. These solutions law and public policy must reject in present conditions and allocate all persons to either the male or female sex."42
The judge called upon medical evidence, which suggested four fundamental criteria of sex: chromosomal, gonadal, apparent or phenotypal and psychological. The individual concerned allegedly possessed the normal female chromosome constitution (46 xx), testicular as well as ovarian tissue, predominantly female appearing (though predominantly male functioning) genitalia and generally male psychosexual attitudes. After weighing these medical considerations, the judge concluded that though the party involved was a so-called "true hermaphrodite," male characteristics prevailed and he should thus be allocated to the male sex.
There is one reported Scottish case dealing with an alleged transsexual, X Petitioner.": It involved a petition brought under section 63 of the Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Scotland) Act of 1854 requesting alteration of petitioner's name and sex as it appeared on the Register, from male to female. X was the father of two, but was separated from his wife, his feminine characteristics having caused a breakdown of the marriage. While raised as a male, he had long since been a transvestite, had developed feminine breasts and had atrophied male genitalia. At the time the petition was brought he was an infirmary patient where he was quite happy to act like a woman. The petition was denied, section 63 being interpreted to allow only changes of entries originally entered incorrectly, not incorrect because of alleged changes in sex subsequent to registry at birth. If for no other reason than the infrequency of judicial pronouncement in this area, the Sheriff's words are worth quoting. He concluded.v' "The doctors are careful to stress that this is not a case of hermaphrodism, but is a genuine case of the very rare condition of transsexualism and that the changes which have taken place are quite irreversible. For the present purpose, I, of course, accept that diagnosis. It is, however, stated that skin and blood tests still show X's basic sex to be a male and that the changes have not yet reached the deepest level of sex determination, It seems to be accordingly that while X could be described as an abnormal male, it would not be possible to describe him as a female." X Petitioner, who had registered a change of name to a female form in the Books of Council of Session, was also permitted by the British Medical Association to appear by this name on their register of qualified medical practitioners. Judicial sanction was, however, not needed or sought for this action.
In discussing the case, Professor Smith has expressed the possibility that if medical expert opinion of sufficient repute supported a petitioner's claim that sex really had changed, the Court of Session might by declarator recognize such a change of sexual status." At present, it appears unlikely. Such a change in sex might be supported by expert medical opinion, either because sex had been originally misappraised or because an individual without clear-cut gender identity (hermaphroditic gender identity) had made the relatively easier "shift" from one side of the sexual identity line to the other.t" None of the eight earlier mentioned criteria of sex are absolutely dispositive of the issue, and due to their predominantly physiological nature, it is difficult to imagine a "change" of sex so convincing as to gain "unquestionable" medical support. However, medical science may yet discover a single criterion, dispositive of "true" sexual identity. (It might also be asked at this point whether or not the law should define a dispositive criterion of sex?)
While the Scottish supreme court in civil matters, the Court of Session, might so declare such a change of sexual status, to the satisfaction and relief of a petitioning transsexual, is it not also possible that the Scottish supreme court in criminal matters, the High Court of Justiciary, could use its declaratory power to define new crimes to hold the performance of a "conversion" surgery as a criminal action? The fact that both these courts are composed of the same men lessens the thrust of this query. Still, the arguably indecent or criminal aspects of the severe demembration involved in such desmasculinizing surgery could well persuade, prevailing standards of decency, the patient's consent and psychosexual craving for the operation notwithstanding. Professor Smith seems to feel the performance of "conversion" surgery on psychiatric indication alone "could rarely be justified by our law-if the organs were healthy and their removal would only contribute to psychological adjustment."47
However, it should be borne in mind that the physician, operating under bona fide standards and credentials in Scotland, is given a very wide discretion by the law, as enforced. As Dr. Gordon has put it, "In practice, however, there is a very wide umbrella which covers all surgical operations performed by recognized doctors in accordance with accepted medical procedures . . . The only exception in practice to the protection afforded to surgical operations is where the operation itself is illegal and the only example of such an operation which has so far been considered by the common law is abortion.V'" And so, as in England, the legal position of the transsexual in Scotland vis-a-vis his right to change his sexual status and of the physician vis-a-vis his liability for performance of a "conversion" operation remains clouded and unsettled.
DENMARK AND SWEDEN
Britain aside, how has the problem of transsexualism been legally treated or received in other countries of Europe? Christine Jorgensen underwent his "conversion" surgery in Denmark. This was perhaps fortunate from the legal point of view, as Denmark, along with Norway and Sweden, allows for voluntary castration of patients whose sexuality makes them a danger to society or when it causes considerable mental disturbance or social deterioration." Holland and certain parts of Switzerland have similar such laws. Normally, in these countries the operation is performed, while above-board, only on resident citizens. This is to prevent influx from elsewhere to obtain treatment."
Notwithstanding these provisions, application was made to the Danish Ministry of Justice for permission to perform a surgical castration in the case of Mr. Jorgensen. After consideration by the Medico-Legal Council, permission to operate was granted.51 A year subsequently, upon the continuing obsessive wish of the patient for removal of his male member also, the operation was performed. But this was only "after it had been established that no legal complications would follow the operation as planned."52
Some accommodation is also made in Denmark and Sweden for transvestites to dress in public as women without legal harassment, but this is apparently only in "extremely rare cases. "53 In Sweden, "conversion" surgery is apparently carried out in certain cases without legal complication. One doctor in the country reported that in carefully selected cases such surgery was indicated, referring to five such operations recently performed. 54 Similarly in France there are recent reports of two cases of transsexualism involving surgical treatment.
GERMANY
Germany has had some experience with the transsexual's problems. In 1943 a man of 35 is reported to have undergone "conversion" surgery (castration and amputation of the penis) and six months later to have been satisfied with his life as a woman.P" More recently, the Hamburg journal Polizei carried an article on the "Rechtsprobleme der Intersexualitat." It discussed the decision of a Berlin court which denied a change of sex status. The court was of the opinion, similar to that expressed by the Sheriff in X Petitioner, supra, that the basic legal determinant of sex was the individual's natural, physical condition at the time of his birth, not any subsequent changes that may occur in that condition due to behaviour patterns, medication or operative procedures. 51 A Berlin (K.G., Kammergericht) case'" and a similar case from the Oberlandesgericht in Frankfurt'" form the modern German judicial authority on the legal aspects of sex alteration operations. There are no decisions of the BGH or Constitutional Court in point.P? Both of these lower court cases came to the conclusion that alteration of sex by surgical removal of the secondary sexual organs will not be accepted by the court, either as a basis for altering a passport (Berlin) or to avoid possible prosecution for homosexuality (Frankfurt). There is no absolute ruling in the two cases on the legal implications of "conversion" or sex alteration surgery; the courts limited themselves to the facts at issue. In the Frankfurt case, the petitioner seeking recognition of his artificial sex operation was a well-known male prostitute who wanted to rid himself of the danger of criminal prosecution by formal recognition of his status as female.
The two cases are criticized in a recent article by a lawyer and a physician." The authors come to the conclusion that, (1) transsexualism is very rare, (2) it is not reversible even by modern hormonal and other treatment, (3) transsexuals tend toward self-demembration and suicide, (4) the medical ("conversion") operation is, in such circumstances, often the only way to help the individual, and (5) this fact should be realized by the law, rather than denying the importance of sex change operations in the law of persons, except in cases of hermaphroditism, as these two earlier-noted decisions apparently do. 62 In Hamburg, it has been recently noted/" the police department issues a special card to local transvestites, based on a physician's certificate. The card does not give them permission to cross-dress as they do, but merely states the bearer is known to the department as a transvestite. This is apparently enough to absolve them from any suspicion of criminal intent due to their "dressing" and, therefore, from arrest.
SWITZERLAND
In 1963, the Schweizische Medizinische Wochenschrift carried an article on "change of sex by surgical operation and subsequent legal recognition of the feminine status of a transvestist.i''" The case was one of "genuine 'constitutional' transvestism based on psychic and psychosexual (pseudo) hermaphroditism.":" Dr. Benjamin would undoubtedly consider such a severe case of "constitutional" transvestism to be transsexualism, because, of the deep mental conflict of the individual described, who in this case resorted to self-mutilation (amputatio penis) due to the characteristic hatred and disgust engendered by his external genitalia. Benjamin dislikes the use of the term "transvestite" to describe all these severely abnormal psychosexuals as it merely names the complex emotional and behavioural disturbance involved after only one of its symptoms-that of dressing in clothes of the other (normally female) sex."6 The use of the term also clouds the distinctions which exist between the simple tranvestite-whose emotional cravings are largely appeased by such unorthodox dressing habits-the more emotionally disturbed who require psychologic guidance and probably endocrine therapy and the yet more deeply disturbed transsexual with his obsessive desire for "conversion" surgery due to the repugnant belief that he is a "woman in a man's body.":"
In this Swiss case, the subject was initially married and the father of one son. Subsequent to his self-mutilation, operative castration was carried out. Furthermore, after having obtained a divorce, the patient succeeded in having his genitals operatively assimilated to the female, presumably meaning the creation of an artificial vagina by inlay grafting and plastic surgery. As an ultimate result, contrary to the earlier discussed Scottish and German cases, the patient was able to have his newly-acquired female status sanctioned by a court of law.
All these rather remarkable changes apparently improved the patient's psychic and social condition over a ten-year period, which prompted a commentator to state that, "there appears to be some ethical justification for such unconventional methods of 'treatment,' and consequently for their use by a doctor."6B
CANADA
In Canada, while there is no specific legal authority dealing with "conversion" surgery as a therapeutic measure, as is true in most countries (because the law has not foreseen the need or purpose of such operations), it has been suggested'" that section 45 of the Criminal Code of Canada should govern the situation. Section 45 reads as follows, "Everyone is protected from criminal responsibility for performing a surgical operation upon any person for the benefit of that person if:
(a) the operation is performed with reasonable care and skill, and (b) it is reasonable to perform the operation, having regard to the state of health of the person at the time the operation is performed and to all the circumstances of the case."
The commentator further suggests that a distinction be made between those who suffer "only" from psychological sexual abnormality-sex deviates and transvestites-and those who suffer also from anatomical abnormality-intersexes and hermaphrodites. Presumably, under this formulation, the transsexual will be placed into the former category, or perhaps fall into a "no-man's-land" in-between. Those in the former category would be outside the scope of admissible surgical help under section 45, whereas those in the latter could have their sexual organs repaired or changed to achieve what medicine feels is their "rightful" sex.?" This, of course, presumes medical science is capable of reaching a consensus on just what determines an individual's "rightful" sex.
The author goes on to state that "conversion" surgery is generally regarded as illegal by the Canadian medical profession," but feels that where the mental and psychological pressure on the sex deviate is so great as to put him on the verge of self-mutilation or suicide (as often is the case with transsexuals), then "conversion" surgery should be treated as legal within section 45 as carried out "for the benefit" of the patient, assuming the necessary medical-psychiatric certification and the patient's written consent were obtained prior to surgery.P
UNITED STATES
In the United States, a paradoxical legal climate towards transsexualism and attendant "conversion" surgery prevails, "for, in the strict sense of the word, there are no laws concerning either transvestism or the various medical aspects concerned with sex transformation. But this fact in no way prevents or nullifies the popular conception that everything connected with this subject is illegal in this country."73 While fear of prosecution under the various mayhem statutes exists, there appear to have been no such actions brought. Regardless of such popular feeling concerning the illegality of "conversion" surgical techniques, a number of such operations are, in fact, carried out and are increasing. This is undoubtedly because of the flexibility and selective enforcement of many United States Laws dealing with sexual matters. 74 While this author has been able to find but one American judicial authority:" dealing with one problem-that of registration-raised by transsexualism, there is indirect evidence of other concern both by the courts'" and by various public, governmental administrative agencies:" with the subject. For example, Dr. Harry Benjamin, reporting on the performance of forty-four "conversion" operations, notes that twelve of the subjects have since been married, some divorced and one granted a legal child adoption.:" Two other practitioners from the west coast of the United States report on several interesting cases involving transsexuals. 79 In one, a man underwent "conversion" surgery in Mexico and subsequently filed a petition for change of his name and civil status in a California court, which denied the petition. In another California case a similar petition was granted. However, the facts were unusual in that petitioner's birth certificate had been made out in the name of "Baby S..." and bore no given name. Furthermore, the county recorder was willing to register the new name and stated sex, so resort to the courts was made unnecessary. In still another case, the individual was apparently able to obtain a change in name, though no action was taken by the court with reference to change of the person's sex registration. Finally, the authors mention an individual granted a United States passport in his female role and characterization, once his physician had written to the proper government authorities recommending such action.s?
A rather daring judicial case is that of a Baltimore, Maryland court in 1965. 8 1 The judge issued a court order to have a sex change operation performed on a seventeen year old transsexual boy and relieved the surgeon of criminal liability therefor. This action followed repeated delinquency by the boy (i.e., stealing wigs for personal use) and application by his parents, the probation officer concerned and a noted Johns Hopkins University psychologist for the operation.
Despite these cases, from most of which a formal judicial ruling was absent, the imprecise application of certain broadly drafted United States laws to these very personal problems looms. For instance, the transvestite's desire to wear and often appear publicly in women's attire is not expressly prohibited by local law, yet it is· not unreasonable to suggest that any such behaviour-at least by men, as women are commonly accepted attired in masculine clothing-eould be declared illegal and punished under most "disorderly conduct,'?" "impersonating," "creating a public nuisance" or "disturbing the peace" local statutes.
Similar reasoning is present with respect to "conversion" surgery. No laws specifically prohibit this type of operation, done in good faith by a physician with his patient's consent. Nevertheless, it has been opined.t" ", . . there is hardly a district attorney in the country who would not inform a doctor that it would be illegal for the doctor to perform such an operation."
However, it should be noted that there may well be considerable divergence between what a district attorney warns against as illegal and what he in fact would actually prosecute as such. While little used "mayhem" statutes might be stretched to apply, the case reports of Dr. Benjamin and others already mentioned would indicate such is not the prevailing practice in the United States today. While the threat of prosecution is restrictive, it is clearly not prohibitive where the surgeon feels sufficient medical necessity exists. Nonetheless, it is probably true that most surgeons would not approve of the "conversion" operation for fear of criticism, while others-who may be willing-cannot get permission from their hospital boards." As a result, the patient's chief obstacle is where to go for help. He may resort to medical sources outside America and undertake a trip to Europe-in recent years, to Casablancav-c-for treatment. But this may well be beyond his means. The patient can expect to spend about $3,000 in fees and three to four weeks in hospital on such a trip. 86 The only recent American judicial pronouncement on registration matters incident-to transsexualism'" does not improve this rather bleak picture to advocates of more lenient legal treatment and greater recognition of transsexuals. As reported, petitioner sought a change in status of sex on his birth certificate. Petitioner had apparently been able to undergo "conversion" surgery and assume the name and role of a woman in society without legal restriction.t" The New York City Board of Health had referred the question of whether it should grant such a change of sex registration to the New York Academy of Medicine. The Academy report decided not to follow the lead of the ten states which had permitted similar registration changes. It stated that "male-to-female transsexuals are still chromosomally males while ostensibly females,":" apparently considering the chromosomal criterion of sex dispositive."? The Academy questioned whether it was the wisest course to cater to the transsexual's needs by granting him a female's legal status. It stated,"
"it is questionable whether laws and records such as the birth certificate should be changed and thereby used as a means to help psychologically ill persons in their social adaptation. . . . The desire of concealment of a change of sex by the transsexual is out-weighed by the public interest for protection against fraud. . . . Sex can be changed where there is an error of course, but not when there is a later attempt to change psychological orientation of the patient and including such surgery as goes with it."92
The New York Board of Health accepted and incorporated the Academy of Medicine's reported conclusions in denying petitioner's request. The Court upheld the Board's action as being within its administrative discretion.
The case appears, from the author's research, to be the most recent legal authority in the United States dealing with transsexualism.
ARGENTINA
Research further indicates that the most recent judicial pronouncement, and apparently the only case dealing directly with the legality of a consented to "conversion" surgery, comes from the Argentine. An opinion by the "Fiscal de Camara," affirmed by the "Poder Judicial de la Nacion." The case,"" a state prosecution against one Dr. Ricardo San Martin, involved a charge of criminal assault brought against the doctor for perfonning "corrective" surgery (i.e. castration and amputation of the penis) on a male homosexual whom the court felt did not manifest feminine characteristics. What criteria the court used in coming to this conclusion is not stated, but it would seem they too relied on chromosomal sex, for the judgment states only that "no female chromatin bodies were found in his cellular nuclei."94
The Fiscal de Camara's opinion, without any consideration of the obvious psychological problems of the patient, stated strongly and flatly that, "There is no scientific reason for the removal of a healthy penis from a physically healthy man. No aesthetic reasons, not the satisfaction of an unhealthy sociological interest, nor the desire to placate the perverted sexual craving of the victim can justify such a removal. The experience of qualified medical staff, the use of proper instruments and medical technique during the operation do not suffice to licitly condone the fact that it is a grievous bodily injury, recognized as a crime by the Penal code ..." (emphasis added).95
It appears from the translation of the case, however, that problems as to the validity of the patient's consent played a part in influencing the judgment against Dr. San Martin. Addressing himself to the defence of consent, the Fiscal rejected it, pointing up the fact that the patient had a "perverted" mind with a mental age of twelve years which effectively prevented him from "rightfully" disposing of his body. 90 The question of whether a normal, intelligent individual could so "rightfully" dispose of his body was left unanswered by the lower court. However, on appeal to the "Poder Judicial de la Nacion" the consent of the patient was held to be no defence to the criminality of the surgical assault, regardless of his unimpaired mental state. Such surgery could not be consented to lawfully. The higher court is reported to have stated, "the consent of the victim is not a defence. The act constitutes grievous bodily injury, and in view of the consequences, society cannot accept the consent of the victim, whose interests are protected by this court. It cannot be submitted that the physician, who accepted this consent, was ignorant of the fact that the consent of the victim was invalidated by the mental incompetence of the victim whose perverted sexual craving distorted the real scope and significance of the operation, even supposing the best results. Fabregas could not be somatically changed into a woman: the differences between body and mind could not be remedied by these means. Although it could be held that it were psychologically possible to give real relief to the craving of Fabregas, such a limited and incomplete solution could not justify the irremediable corporal harm caused, apart from the moral and social implications."97 (C) CONCLUSIONS True cases of transsexualism are exceedingly rare and their less serious counterpart transvestism is more frequent but still relatively rare. Because of the infrequency of both deviations and their common distastefulness, there is a tendency not to come to grips with their attendant legal problems. This is unfair to those unfortunate enough to suffer these abnormalities. As medical science seeks for an answer to their maladies, the law should, it is submitted, look upon present methods of treatment compassionately.
While supporters of "conversion" surgical treatment for transsexuals counsel that psychiatric and hormonal treatment is of no help in severe cases, they cannot guarantee the success of surgical treatment either. Some commentators suggest that a distinction should be drawn between the hermaphrodite or intersex who is in need of anatomical cure (a change to match genetic sex) and the transvestite and other such sex deviates who presumably are anatomically normal, but in need of psychological cure to bring their mental state into harmony with their physique (a "cosmetic" change to satisfy psychej.P" Under such a classification, the transsexual would be in the latter class. The proponents of such a distinction suggest surgery as proper in the first instance only to repair or change the individual's sex organs for his benefit and so as to achieve his "rightful" sex.P"
The motivation for drawing such a distinction undoubtedly stems from the belief that a person's anatomy may be altered surgically, where it includes contradictory sexual elements, to align it with "proper," genetic or chromosomal sex, but not where the psychosexual orientation of the individual-not his anatomy-is the only element inconsistent with genetic sex. The assumption behind this distinction may be that all persons are immutably either male or female (though in weaker or stronger degree 1 0 0 ) and while this fact may be "clarified" by surgery (intersexualism), it should not and cannot be "rebutted" by surgery (transsexualismj.l'" While this distinction is a valuable one and while surgical treatment should be permitted in cases of physiological intersexualism (hermaphroditism), such treatment, it is submitted, cannot be inevitably condemned in cases of transsexualism.
The New York Academy of Medicine in the Weiner case opined that the abnormal psychological wants of the transsexual should not be aided by legal co-operation in the individual's attempts at social adaptation and recognition as a female. This co-operation, while perhaps easing his torment, does nothing to alleviate or cure his abnormal feelings toward himself. This argument is a strong one against the legality of "conversion" surgery as well as against official recognition-via public records and vital statistics registration-of "changed" sex.
The New York Academy of Medicine came to the conclusion that male-tofemale transsexuals are still chromosomally males. While this may not be invariably true,l°2 it will normally be the case. As a result, physical "conversion" surgery is at the same time an irreversible yet incomplete therapy. Surely, in these circumstances, the thrust of the law should be to encourage the pursuit of insights into cure of the transsexual's mental and psychosexual condition, not to encourage severe physical invasions of the individual's bodily integrity. This is not to say, however, that all "conversion" surgery should be outlawed, for in some, very few, but very severe, cases, it may be the only measure to prevent self-mutilation, demembration, suicide or permanent mental derangement. In such cases the law must take account of the terrible pressures on the patient and the humanitarian, therapeutic motives of his surgeon.
As with other controversial operations which are or may be unlawful unless carried out for therapeutic purposes-abortion and sterilization---conversion surgery could be likewise made subject to a similar exception, although lawmakers may well feel compelled to give carefully limited scope to the "therapeutic" justification for conversion surgery.
The analogy to sterilization here is particularly relevant. The public policy considerations that will determine the permissible scope of "conversion" surgery are similar to those that will set the legal limits for sterilization. The inquiry in both cases is concerned fundamentally with the extent to which an individual's consent will insulate the performing surgeon from criminal liability for a surgical invasion of the body that is repugnant or unjustified to many. It may eventually be resolved that consent to such operations will only negate their criminality when their purpose is considered to be therapeutic. The question then to be resolved will be, what is therapeutic?
While "conversion" surgery for transsexuals involves a more severe, more repugnant bodily infringement, it is also sought to be justified on wider, rather atypical "therapeutic" grounds. The practice is often advocated not so much to ease the torment and suffering of the transsexual as it is to serve as a "therapeutic" measure to prevent him from harming himself either physically (by self-mutilation or auto-castration) or mentally. The therapeutic effect then of the surgery is indirect, in deterring the patient from subsequently injuring himself. This is an extension of traditional interpretations of therapeutic motive and it remains to be seen whether public policy will accept such an extension in this controversial context.
If full, knowing consent has been given by the patient and medical opinion feels "conversion" surgery in some degree is irrefutably indicated, then, it is submitted, the public has no interest in denying the acute transsexual the only means currently known to medical science for relief of his severe, self-endangering condition by threatening the performing surgeon with criminal prosecution.
The criminal law of most countries today appears flexible enough to handle this problem without amendment. However, jurists and medical men should consider the peculiar difficulties facing patient and physician in certain transsexual cases. They should keep proper perspective. Obviously it is unwise and impossible for the surgeon to solve all psychological urges and needs by physical operation. It is unlawful for a physician to aid a patient with an obsessive psychological urge to die, or to cut off the arm of one who wants to stop masturbating. At the same time, however, if it is a question between surgical intervention and suicide, self-mutilation or permanent psychosis it would seem that the weight of opinion must fall in favour of the former measure-incomplete and stop-gap in approach as it may be. Eventually, hopefully, the transsexual's torment can be attacked and solved where it originates-deep in his psyche. But until that time, the law should strive as best it can to come into harmony with the current state of medical knowledge, opinion and prescribed treatment in this delicate area. This task is made more difficult because in addition to medico-legal problems, transsexualism casts its shadow over a wide area of ethics, religion and morality.
Once it is acknowledged that "conversion" surgery may be justified and legally defensible in certain severe circumstances, the attendant problem of public records alteration and re-registration must be considered. Clearly there is a strong element of public reliance on the accuracy and conclusiveness of public records. They are a check against fraud and misrepresentation as well as a means of identification and verification. As a result, society has a strong interest in preserving the accuracy of such devices of registration as birth certificates, marriage licences and passports. It cannot afford to sacrifice the integrity of such documents and related laws in order to placate certain abnormal elements within society and facilitate their social adaptation.
Arguably, it is an anomalous solution to permit "conversion" surgery in clearly indicated cases, yet to refuse to allow amendment of public records and official private documents to accord with the newly altered physical status of the transsexual. As one authority in the field has commented. "One thing seems certain. While great conservatism should prevail in advising, consenting to, and performing a conversion operation, all possible help should be given to those who present a [ait accompli by having undergone the irrevocable step of surgery. It seems to me to be the duty not only of the physicians, but also of the community, to pave the way as much as possible for such persons [by legal sanctioning and recording of the sex change carried out by surgery] so that they can succeed in their new pattern of life as members of the opposite sex."103
The allowance of "conversion" surgery, but the prohibition of concomitant public record alterations is not necessarily anomalous if additions to, but not changes in, sexual status on these records is permitted. It is submitted that the most desirable solution to this problem is the compromise solution. Namely, amendment of sexual status on public records could be allowed by including the "new" sex after "conversion" surgery, while stilI retaining the original sex classification on the documents. Of course, cases where the original classification of sex had been made incorrectly, as, for example, in cases of "true hermaphroditism," would not be governed by this limitation, but rather sex registration could be changed completely upon the showing of appropriate evidence.
This suggested compromise solution would insure the public interest in accurate, non-fraudulent public records and indices of identification, as such interest must be considered overriding. At the same time, the "new" sexual status achieved could govern legal rights-including marriage-while the "old," originally entered (and not proved to be incorrect when entered) sex designation would remain as a check against misrepresentation and fraud. By such a device, third parties would be protected to some extent in their dealings with the feminized, but not female, transsexual male (and vice-versa).
In the last analysis, cases of transsexualism are too few and too little understood to prompt the formulation of inhibiting, specific legal rules. The law as written, imperfect yet flexible, is elastic enough in most countries to treat the transsexual problem wisely and adequately, if it is interpreted and applied by men of understanding temperament, unshackled by religious dogma or legal formalism in their approach to what are intensely personal problems which must be solved in the most compassionate manner possible, consistent with the general good.
